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The depth of emotion that surrounds public and pri-vate conversations about the relationship between Israel and the U.S. can be staggering. From college 
campuses to church groups, think tanks to synagogues, and 
op-ed pages to congressional hearings, few issues are as con-
tentious as America’s relationship with the State of Israel. 
 Supporters of Israel in the U.S. stress shared values and 
a friendship that is crucial for securing U.S. interests in the 
Middle East. Despite the turmoil of the Arab Spring and 
the instability that increasingly marks U.S. relations with 
longstanding allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, backers 
of a strong U.S.-Israel partnership highlight the benefits of 
maintaining close ties and continuing to provide extensive 
economic and military aid to Israel.
For critics of the U.S.-Israel relationship, it is this close 
friendship that has fueled hostility toward the U.S. in the Arab 
world. Critics point to the lack of even-handedness that charac-
terizes U.S.-Israeli relations, citing Washington’s acquiescence 
to settlement expansion in the West Bank, the lack of movement 
in the peace talks with the Palestinian Authority, and strategic 
differences over relations with Iran and regional allies. 
Why is it so difficult to openly debate these matters? For 
many, Israel’s place in the U.S. is not simply a question of 
how to best secure foreign policy goals in the Middle East. 
For domestic supporters of Israel—Jewish and non-Jewish 
alike—the country’s fate and America’s role in protecting its 
future raises an existential question of national survival. To 
question support for Israel or its foreign policy is perceived 
by some as casting doubt on the broader trajectory of politi-
cal Zionism and Israel’s right to exist. Conversely, domestic 
defenders of Palestinian rights—whether Muslim, Christian 
or Jewish—feel that valid concerns about the roots of the 
Palestinian refugee problem, the occupation of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip after 1967, and Israel’s treatment of its 
U.S. President Barack Obama shakes hands with Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu during their press conference in Jerusalem, 
part of Obama’s official state visit to Israel and the Palestinian Territories in March 2013. (KOBI GIDEON/GPO/FLASH90/REDUX)
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non-Jewish citizens are overlooked in 
the mainstream media and political dis-
course. Vocalizing this unease, by rais-
ing genuine concern about the fate of 
Palestinian rights or Israel’s viability as 
a self-defined “Jewish and Democratic 
state,” is often portrayed as exhibiting 
an anti-Jewish prejudice, a dangerous 
conflation of criticism toward Israel’s 
domestic and foreign policy agenda 
with anti-Semitism. In light of the pas-
sion and polemics such debate engen-
ders, how can a more constructive con-
versation take place? 
No matter one’s take on U.S.-Israeli 
relations, it is clear that the nature of 
this relationship and its future prospects 
will continue to be a central concern for 
policymakers and citizens in the coming 
years. There is a need to think histori-
cally about how the U.S.-Israel relation-
ship has developed, and its attendant 
complexities over the last six and a half 
decades. The course of this relationship 
has never been a clear-cut tale of abid-
ing friendship or persistent antagonism; 
there has always been a fair amount of 
both. In revisiting this history, it is help-
ful to examine Israel’s recurring Palestin-
ian question, which remains at the heart 
of regional conflicts and related policy 
debates. Israel’s own strategic position 
in the Middle East requires attention as 
well, particularly in light of the way in 
which revolutions and counterrevolu-
tions in the Arab world have transformed 
the region. 
Where are U.S.-Israeli relations head-
ing? What are the challenges these two 
countries are facing, and how can the re-
cent past offer guidance on the choices 
that lie ahead? No one could argue that 
these decisions are clear-cut. Perhaps 
identifying the origins and milestones 
that have characterized Israeli-American 
relations since Israel’s establishment in 
1948 can delineate a tenable path for-
ward. There is too much at stake—for 
the U.S., Israel, Palestine and the great-
er Middle East—to ignore the difficult 
questions along the way. n
Historical backdrop 
In the aftermath of World War II, the U.S. assumed a position of promi-
nence in the Middle East, filling the 
vacuum left by departing colonial 
powers. ⁠ The guiding motivation behind 
U.S. involvement in the region after 
1945 shifted from the rhetoric defend-
ing self-determination, which charac-
terized President Woodrow Wilson’s 
14 Points, ⁠ to a more strategic interest 
in securing access to oil resources and 
containing the U.S.S.R. Yet ideological 
support for Zionism, a modern national 
movement seeking the establishment 
of a Jewish state in Palestine, could 
be found in the White House and Con-
gress. It came into conflict with more 
pragmatic attitudes in the departments 
of State and Defense and the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA). President 
Harry S. Truman, much to the conster-
nation of some of his advisers, was the 
first foreign leader to recognize the 
newly created state of Israel in 1948. 
Over 700,000 Palestinians were ex-
pelled or fled from territories that be-
came Israel in the course of the 1948 
Arab-Israeli War (an event Palestinians 
describe as the nakba, or “catastro-
phe”). American policymakers focused 
exclusively on the humanitarian needs 
of these refugees rather than the politi-
cal dimension of their dispossession. 
This approach was reflected in the ex-
tensive support for the refugee resettle-
ment work of the United Nations Relief 
Works Agency (unrwa). It also shaped 
the course of American relations with 
Israel and the Palestinians in the ensu-
ing decades, as the burgeoning refugee 
population in the neighboring Arab 
states of Lebanon, Jordan and Syria 
grappled with the consequences of pro-
longed statelessness.
U.S. support for Israel was not in-
evitable or historically consistent in the 
early years of Israel’s existence. Rather, 
it only took on its “special” character-
istics later on. In the wake of 1948, for 
example, the U.S. generally displayed 
an even-handed stance toward Israel 
and the Arab world as part of a broader 
Cold War containment strategy. During 
the administration of President Dwight 
D. Eisenhower, this approach dove-
tailed with the Eisenhower Doctrine, a 
strategy aimed at wresting individual 
Arab countries away from the U.S.S.R. ⁠ 
Eisenhower’s approach to the Middle 
East culminated with his forceful oppo-
sition to the British, French and Israeli 
action during the Suez Crisis of 1956. 
The president’s critical stance was a re-
sult of persistent concerns that Israeli 
actions were undermining U.S. interests 
in the Middle East. The U.S. threatened 
to impose economic sanctions against 
Israel, even threatening to expel the 
country from the United Nations (UN) 
and disassociate from it politically. ⁠ An 
explicit alliance with Israel was viewed 
as undermining relations with Arab 
states. As Secretary of State John Fos-
ter Dulles noted, “backing Israel might 
be very costly to vital United States na-
tional interests.”⁠ Although Eisenhower 
forced Israel to withdraw from the Si-
nai during the Suez campaign, he also 
acknowledged the legitimacy of Israeli 
security concerns.⁠
John F. Kennedy’s ascendancy to 
the White House heralded a shift in 
U.S. policy aims and methods toward 
the Middle East, with the new presi-
dent taking bold steps to engage with 
adversaries like Gamal Abdel Nasser 
in Egypt in a bid to promote regional 
stability. Yet the shifting reality of the 
Cold War also pushed the U.S. much 
closer to Israel, and Kennedy began to 
treat the young country as a bulwark 
against growing Soviet interests in the 
Middle East. ⁠ To this end, U.S. policy-
makers stressed shared values with the 
Jewish state and offered military and 
economic aid to assert regional influ-
ence. Kennedy, according to the scholar 
Yaakov Bar-Simon Tov “was the first 
president to define US-Israeli relations 
as special, to take seriously Israel’s se-
curity problems, and to provide Israel 
with major defensive arms.”⁠ As Warren 
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Bass details in his aptly named study 
of U.S.-Israel relations in this period, 
Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle 
East and the Making of the US-Israel 
Alliance, Israel managed to introduce 
a nuclear program despite Kennedy’s 
deep concern with proliferation. 
1967 war and aftermath
The replacement of Israeli Prime Minis-
ter David Ben-Gurion with Levi Eshkol 
in 1963 and the onset of Lyndon B. John-
son’s presidency further strengthened 
U.S.-Israeli relations. Eshkol gave way 
on nuclear development and allowed 
periodic U.S. inspection of the Dimona 
Reactor in return for greater military co-
ordination and aid. Johnson, who was 
personally “warm and admiring” toward 
Israel in the view of one expert, decided 
to supply the country with direct arms 
shipments, including Skyhawk aircraft 
with strike capability. ⁠ Having supplied 
arms to Saudi Arabia and Jordan as 
well, Johnson’s alignment with Israel 
was seen as a move to counter Soviet 
regional influence. 
Johnson’s focus on Vietnam may 
have shifted the Middle East to a lower 
priority, but the outbreak of a full scale 
Arab-Israeli war in June 1967 (also 
known as the Six Day War) moved the 
region and the fate of U.S.-Israeli rela-
tions to center stage. America’s politi-
cal backing “enabled Israel to realize its 
military aims free of the threat of Soviet 
intervention.”⁠ Israel’s swift victory in the 
Six Day War was a watershed moment, 
not least because it secured control of 
Arab territory in the Sinai Peninsula, 
the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and the 
Golan Heights. Johnson decided there 
should not be a return to the status quo, 
supporting Eshkol’s bid to retain the ter-
ritories until the Arab states recognized 
Israel and made peace.⁠ This stance was 
codified in November 1967 in UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 242, which was 
understood internationally as a guideline 
for pursuing an exchange of “land for 
peace,” but by many accounts did not 
call for a full withdrawal from all the ter-
ritories. The resolution also did not refer 
to the Palestinians directly, calling for a 
“just settlement to the refugee problem,” 
without mentioning the fate of the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.
Israel’s territorial expansion in these 
areas raised profound political and de-
mographic questions for the country’s 
leadership. Weeks after the war ended, 
the question of how to manage the Pal-
estinian population took on central im-
portance. A “decision not to decide,” in 
the words of Israeli historian Avi Raz, 
ensured control over the territories 
themselves while avoiding a political 
resolution of the Palestinian question 
in national or territorial terms.⁠ The cre-
ation of the first West Bank settlements 
in the aftermath of the 1967 War marked 
the start of a ongoing occupation that 
has indelibly marked U.S. involvement 
in the region.⁠ 
Even with its expansive territorial 
aspirations, Israel was seen as a region-
al ally capable of defending U.S. inter-
ests in the Middle East. The election of 
President Richard M. Nixon challenged 
this new reality. Nixon was suspicious 
of Washington’s tilt toward Jerusalem, 
and equally apprehensive that missteps 
in the Arab world had undermined U.S. 
strategic interests in the Middle East. 
Soon after he entered office in 1969, he 
told Secretary of State William Rogers 
that he sought an “even-handed policy,” 
Note: Israeli settlements in Gaza were evacuated in 2005. 
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including Israel’s return of the territo-
ries occupied in 1967, but he faced op-
position both from Israel and some of 
his advisers.⁠ National Security Adviser 
Henry Kissinger, who opposed Nixon’s 
settlement plan, stated, “the longer Is-
rael holds its conquered Arab territory, 
the longer the Soviets cannot deliver 
what the Arabs want.” ⁠
A crucial development in U.S.-Israeli 
relations followed after Egyptian Presi-
dent Nasser’s death in September 1970. 
The new Egyptian president, Anwar al-
Sadat, pivoted his country to the west, 
seeking to align with the U.S. rather 
than the Soviet Union. In a bid to force 
a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
Sadat launched the 1973 October War 
against Israel. As historian Craig Daigle 
has recently argued, Sadat wanted to cre-
ate a “crisis of detente” so as to break the 
region’s status quo. Following an Arab 
attack on the morning of Yom Kippur, 
the holiest day in the Jewish religious 
calendar, Israel’s leadership sought out 
U.S. aid to turn the tide of the fighting. 
A massive U.S. airlift of tanks and air-
planes reversed the Egyptian and Syrian 
advances, and further solidified close 
U.S.-Israeli relations. 
With Nixon distracted by the Wa-
tergate scandal, Kissinger negotiated 
the terms of agreement to end the war. 
They were passed as UN Security 
Council Resolution 338, which called 
for a “just and durable peace in the 
Middle East” along the lines of UN 
Security Council Resolution 242 after 
the 1967 War. Kissinger, as Nixon’s 
envoy and later as Secretary of State 
to President Gerald Ford, pursued a 
step-by-step approach to achieve a 
diplomatic solution between Israel 
and her neighbors. But these attempts 
at negotiating a comprehensive solu-
tion favored a piecemeal approach that 
separated the Israeli-Palestinian issue 
from broader regional concerns. Pales-
tinian national aspirations, which were 
emerging as a central point of conten-
tion between Israel and the Arab states, 
were ignored by Kissinger’s diplomatic 
initiatives, such as reaching a cease-fire 
between Israel, Syria and Egypt. The 
consequences of 1973, therefore, may 
have strengthened U.S.-Egyptian and 
U.S.-Israeli relations, but postwar di-
plomacy also prolonged regional con-
flict indefinitely. 
reemergence of  
the Palestinian question
By the late 1970s, a small number of 
American officials began to recognize 
the necessity of limited Palestinian 
rights, fueled by the broader wave of 
decolonization around the globe. The 
election of President Jimmy Carter in 
1976 helped crystallize this paradigm 
shift. Carter’s administration took a 
regional rather than strictly Cold War 
approach to Israel and the Middle East, 
marked by a concern with localized 
political dynamics and awareness of 
the need to deal with the Palestinian 
issue head on.⁠ Carter asserted that the 
Israel-Palestine dispute was at the heart 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict and should 
be tackled directly. He also spoke 
openly of the need for a “Palestinian 
homeland,” making him the first U.S. 
president to use that term. Carter’s crit-
ics bitterly opposed such an approach, 
fearful about the emergence of a Pal-
estinian state. The military activity of 
the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) and other Palestinian nationalist 
groups had raised the global profile of 
the Palestinian struggle, but also gener-
ated widespread condemnation given 
the Palestinian use of violent tactics to 
achieve nationalist ends. Nevertheless, 
by singling out the Palestinian question 
for substantive consideration while en-
gaging Israel on the need for permanent 
territorial borders, the Carter adminis-
tration helped reshape the parameters 
of any eventual settlement. 
The election of Israeli Prime Min-
ister Menachem Begin in 1977 repre-
sented a decisive challenge to U.S.-Is-
raeli relations. Begin was a revisionist 
Zionist with deep-seated ideological 
opposition to Palestinian territorial 
rights. He was also a believer in settle-
ment expansion in the occupied territo-
ries, which he pursued with the help of 
Ariel Sharon, his agriculture minister 
and later Israel’s 11th prime minister. 
Roughly 5,000 Jewish settlers lived in 
the West Bank when Begin entered of-
fice; however, the number of settlers 
continued to rise, to over 80,000 by the 
late 1980s, even after the signing of the 
historic Camp David Accords.⁠ These ac-
cords, reached on September 17, 1978, 
led to a formal Egypt-Israel peace treaty 
signed by Sadat and Begin on March 
26, 1979. The treaty ensured the return 
of the Sinai Peninsula to Egypt, but Be-
gin’s price was the retention of the West 
Bank, which he referred to by the bibli-
cal name of “Judea and Samaria.” The 
peace treaty also included more military 
and economic aid to Israel than had been 
given under any previous administra-
U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in the cabin of his aircraft in September 1975, as 
he flew from Alexandria, Egypt, to Tel Aviv, Israel, during negotiations to return the Sinai, 
which was captured by Israel during the 1967 War, back to Egypt. (DAVID HUME KENNERLY/
GETTY IMAGES)
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tion: $10.2 billion over four years, a little 
less than half in grants.⁠ Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia also received military aid and se-
curity guarantees, highlighting the spec-
trum of U.S. allies in the Middle East. 
Strategic relationship 
Ronald Reagan’s election victory in 
1980 signaled a return to global Cold 
War geopolitics, reconstituting the Mid-
dle East as a site of contestation between 
the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. Given this new 
reality, relations with Israel were grant-
ed strategic priority. General Alexander 
Haig, Reagan’s hawkish secretary of 
state, articulated a policy of “strategic 
consensus” between the U.S., Israel and 
pro-American Arab governments. Given 
the limits of regional cooperation, the 
Reagan administration signed a Memo-
randum of Understanding enshrining 
bilateral cooperation with Israel on No-
vember 30, 1981. This strategic alliance 
included military cooperation between 
the U.S. and Israel, and U.S. policymak-
ers afforded Israel the special status of 
an ally for the first time. As William 
Quandt, a leading scholar of U.S. foreign 
policy has written, “the entire relation-
ship was given a strategic rationale that 
had previously been missing.” 
Despite this alliance, divergent in-
terests emerged in the 1980s, beginning 
with Reagan’s decision to sell AWACS 
and F-15 aircraft to Saudi Arabia. The 
limits of the Israeli-American relation-
ship emerged most visibly during Is-
rael’s 1982 war in Lebanon (the “First 
Lebanon War”). The invasion was ini-
tially an attempt by Israel to contain 
Palestinian attacks on its northern bor-
der towns, but it quickly escalated into 
a full-scale effort to remake Lebanon as 
Israel’s Christian ally. Secretary Haig 
was informed of Israel’s war plans by 
Israeli Defense Minister Ariel Sharon in 
the spring of 1982. Israel’s unprecedent-
ed siege of Beirut that summer disturbed 
Reagan deeply and led to a confronta-
tion with Prime Minister Begin. After 
Reagan and his advisers realized that 
Israel’s actions posed serious challenges 
to their broader Middle East strategy, the 
president remarked to Begin that “Your 
actions in Lebanon have seriously under-
mined our relationship with those Arab 
governments whose cooperation is es-
sential to protect the Middle East from 
external threats and to counter forces 
of Soviet-sponsored radicalism and Is-
lamic fundamentalism now growing in 
the region…. U.S. influence in the Arab 
world, our ability to achieve our strategic 
objectives, has been seriously damaged 
by Israel’s actions.”⁠
The PLO’s evacuation from Beirut 
at the end of August seemed to provide 
a window of stability for diplomatic 
action. Reagan unveiled his adminis-
tration’s new peace plan, dubbed the 
Reagan Plan, in a primetime address on 
September 1, 1982. Building on Carter’s 
Camp David framework, he acknowl-
edged that implementation of the Camp 
David Accords had been slow. “Israel 
exists; it has a right to exist in peace 
behind secure and defensible borders; 
and it has a right to demand of its neigh-
bors that they recognize those facts,” the 
president remarked.⁠ Reagan continued: 
“[W]e must also move to resolve the 
root causes of conflict between Arabs 
and Israelis.” The central question, he 
said, was “how to reconcile Israel’s le-
gitimate security concerns with the le-
gitimate rights of the Palestinians.”⁠ For 
Reagan, this meant “self-government 
by the Palestinians in the West Bank 
and Gaza in association with Jordan,” 
as well as “the immediate adoption of a 
settlement freeze by Israel.” The Reagan 
Plan reflected a return to the notion of 
comprehensive peace; however, it did 
not support outright the creation of a Pal-
estinian state, opting instead for Palestin-
ian self-government in association with 
Jordan. Begin was incensed with the new 
plan issued by the White House. He and 
his cabinet issued a swift rejection, and 
the Reagan Plan became the last serious 
attempt to broker a solution to the Arab-
Israeli conflict in the 1980s. 
U.S. involvement with Lebanon in-
creased in the wake of Israeli military 
action. Reagan redeployed U.S. Marines 
to Beirut out of guilt over the failure to 
protect Palestinian civilians slaughtered 
in the Sabra and Shatila massacre of 
September 1982, paving the way for 
further bloodshed. In October 1983, the 
bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks 
by Syrian and Iranian proxies led to the 
death of 241 U.S. servicemen, the high-
est number of American military deaths 
in one day since the Vietnam War. Hav-
ing grown resentful of the Israeli and 
American presence in their country, 
local opposition militias metastasized 
into the birth of Hezbollah, an Iranian-
backed paramilitary organization that 
emerged as a key player in the region 
during the early 1980s. “American Cold 
War naiveté opened the door for Iran in 
Lebanon,” said one scholar of the period.⁠ 
In this regard, U.S.-Israeli relations are 
meaningful beyond debates over mili-
tary or economic aid, having precipitated 
transformations in the Middle East in a 
President Jimmy Carter, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat (left) and Israeli Prime Minister 
Menachem Begin (right) stand during the playing of national anthems on the north lawn 
of the White House during ceremonies for the Camp David Peace Accords in March 1979. 
(WALLY MCNAMEE/CORBIS)
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manner that has affected both countries 
well into the 21st century.
Palestinian agitation continued to 
grow in the occupied territories in the 
wake of the PLO’s evacuation from Bei-
rut. By December 1987 Israel’s control 
over the Palestinian territories was seen 
as intolerable, and spontaneous protests 
erupted in the Gaza Strip and spread to the 
West Bank. The first Intifada (“shaking 
off”) exploded, demonstrating that Isra-
el’s subjugation of the Palestinians could 
not be ignored. Israeli Defense Minister 
and future Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin 
publicly sanctioned “a policy of beatings 
and breaking of bones.” Before long, as 
Quandt notes,“images of savage Israeli 
beatings of Palestinian youngsters were 
a part of the American evening television 
news.”⁠ Israel’s image in the mind of the 
U.S., long informed by cultural assump-
tions of a biblical David (Israel) fighting 
Goliath (the Arab states), had been over-
turned. 
The PLO, which was based in exile in 
Tunis, was “more surprised than the Is-
raelis” by the uprising, which was entirely 
generated from within the territories, and 
was a spontaneous eruption. Seeing an 
opportunity to capitalize on popular dis-
content in order to secure political clout, 
the PLO began to play a leadership role in 
the Intifada—as did the Muslim Brother-
hood’s Palestinian off-shoot Hamas, the 
Islamic Resistance Movement. However, 
it was the PLO, long maligned by Israel 
and the U.S. as a terrorist organization, 
that would gradually emerge as the sole 
representative of the Palestinian people. 
In one of President Reagan’s final 
acts in office, the U.S. agreed to begin a 
dialogue with the PLO. Its longstanding 
leader, Yasser Arafat, formally accepted 
UN Resolution 242 in December 1988, 
acknowledging Israel’s right to exist and 
renouncing terrorism. The PLO’s recog-
nition of Israel and acceptance of the “two 
state solution” had begun to emerge in the 
mid-1970s, and was implicitly endorsed 
as part of the November 1988 Palestinian 
Declaration of Independence. Arafat’s ac-
companying public statement in Geneva 
ended on a triumphal note: “Victory is 
at hand. I see the homeland in your holy 
stones. I see the flag of our independent 
Palestine fluttering over the hills of our 
beloved homeland.”⁠ n
The election of George H. W. Bush precipitated new opportunities and 
challenges for U.S. diplomatic rela-
tions with Israel. During Bush’s ten-
ure and with the help of Secretary of 
State James Baker, the peace process 
was revitalized as a key foreign policy 
goal for the U.S. The context for this re-
emergence was the end of the Cold War, 
which had removed the Soviet threat, 
and the outbreak of the first Gulf War 
in 1990. Israel’s special relationship 
with the U.S. suffered as its strategic 
value in the region was undermined 
by international events, and Reagan’s 
personal warmth toward Israel gave 
The peace process 
way to the tougher stance of Bush and 
Baker. The two men did not appreciate 
the obstinacy of Israeli Prime Minister 
Yitzhak Shamir, and viewed his settle-
ment policy as “a deliberate attempt to 
foil US peacemaking.” ⁠ One particularly 
bitter debate erupted around the U.S. 
refusal to grant Israel loan guarantees 
of $10 billion in light of ongoing settle-
ment expansion. Baker publicly recited 
the number of the White House switch-
board at a press conference, telling the 
Israelis, “When you are serious about 
peace, call us!”⁠
Bush and Baker launched the Ma-
drid Conference in October 1991. It was 
the first official face-to-face gathering 
that included representatives from Is-
rael, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and the 
Palestinian Territories. The Palestinians 
were part of a joint Jordanian delegation 
coordinating closely with the PLO lead-
ership in Tunis, who were prevented 
from attending the conference by Isra-
el. President Bush and Soviet President 
Mikhael Gorbachev co-chaired these 
direct multilateral negotiations, which 
were significant but short-lived; more 
symbolic than substantive. Among the 
most important procedural legacies 
of Madrid was the idea of an interim 
agreement between Israel and the Pales-
An Israeli soldier restrains another from manhandling an arrested Palestinian who lies on 
a Nablus street with his hands tied together, during anti-Israeli demonstrations in the first 
intifada in February 1988. (ERIC FEFERBERG/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)
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tinians, a move that deferred final status 
issues like the refugee question and the 
fate of Jerusalem.   
This pattern of negotiating would 
persist following the Oslo Accords, 
which were signed on the South Lawn 
of the White House on September 13, 
1993. The Accords, which resulted from 
secret talks in Norway’s capital, were 
considered a breakthrough in the Israe-
li-Palestinian conflict as they formally 
launched a multi-year peace process 
between the parties. President William 
Jefferson Clinton, the former governor 
from Arkansas who had developed close 
ties with Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak 
Rabin, took an active role as a full 
partner in these negotiations. Clinton’s 
close cooperation with the Israelis fos-
tered Rabin’s confidence, who famously 
shook hands with Yasser Arafat as their 
deputies signed the Declaration of Prin-
cipals. As Clinton’s first term ended, the 
U.S.-Israeli partnership had become a 
cornerstone of American foreign policy. 
In the words of Vice President Albert 
Gore, this convergence was “the closest 
we have with any of our friends and al-
lies anywhere in the world.”⁠ 
But the peace process launched by 
the Oslo Accords was nowhere near as 
picture perfect as the famous handshake 
suggested. In September 1995, Arafat 
and Rabin signed the Interim Agree-
ment on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, 
or Oslo II, establishing the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) and dividing the West 
Bank into three separate zones of con-
trol. There was enormous skepticism of 
Arafat’s move in the Arab world, where 
he was seen as selling out meaningful 
Palestinian sovereignty for the sake of 
his own return to the West Bank, where 
he was to be appointed as president of 
the PA. Oslo II granted the PA limited 
self-government, for an interim period 
of time, providing the vestiges of state-
hood without actual content. The pro-
cess around Oslo lulled its proponents 
into the false belief that real issues like 
Jerusalem, refugees’ right of return, set-
tlements and security were being dealt 
with. Oslo II became the basis of the 
Wye River Memorandum in 1998 and 
President George W. Bush’s Roadmap 
for Peace in 2002. 
Extremists on both sides of the con-
flict detested Oslo and its consequences 
and attempted to undermine the interim 
milestones it aimed to secure. In Israel, 
Rabin’s concessions in negotiating with 
the Palestinians set off denunciations by 
right-wing politicians and incitement 
against the prime minister. On Novem-
ber 4, 1995, after a rally to support 
Oslo, Rabin was assassinated.
collapse 
Benjamin Netanyahu, a fierce critic of 
the Oslo process and leader of the Likud 
party, defeated Labor leader Shimon 
Peres in the 1996 elections to replace 
Rabin. A spate of suicide bombings 
by Hamas inside Israel prompted sup-
port of a hardline politician who was 
outspoken against terrorism. Clinton 
worked to revive the floundering Oslo 
process, and he brought Netanyahu and 
Arafat together in Maryland at the Wye 
River Plantation in October 1998. The 
memorandum that resulted advanced 
the interim steps of Oslo and signaled 
an agreement to resume permanent sta-
tus negotiations. 
Yet despite the U.S.’ best efforts, the 
Oslo Accords were beset by structural 
deficiencies and the erosion of trust be-
tween the parties. The PA never got con-
trol of more than 18% of the territory 
in the West Bank, and settlements con-
tinued to expand at a rapid pace, with 
the number of Israeli settlers doubling 
between 1993 and 2000. Daily life for 
Palestinians did not improve, given the 
ongoing restrictions of movement and 
the limited Israeli military redeploy-
ment in the territories. Hamas, which 
rejected the concessions of Oslo, was 
increasingly seen as a counterweight to 
the corruption-prone environment devel-
oping around Arafat and his advisers. 
Determined to overcome these 
shortcomings, Clinton hastily launched 
a summit at Camp David in July 2000. 
Ehud Barak, a Labor leader with more 
moderate views than Netanyahu, had 
been elected prime minister in May 
1999 with a mandate to carry on with 
Rabin’s pursuit of peace. Clinton invit-
ed Barak and Arafat to join him at Camp 
David in an effort to break the logjam 
around the negotiations, but it was a 
piecemeal attempt that left key issues 
unresolved. There would not be a full 
return to the 1967 borders, and issues 
such as sovereignty over Jerusalem and 
the right of return for Palestinian refu-
gees remained unresolved. ⁠ The debate 
over Barak’s final offer and Arafat’s re-
fusal is a fierce one, yet blame for the 
collapse of the summit was pinned en-
tirely on the Palestinians by Clinton and 
his advisers. In a final attempt to revive 
the failed talks before leaving office, 
Clinton crafted a set of parameters in 
December that led to the Taba Summit 
U.S. President Bill Clinton watches as PLO leader Yasser Arafat shakes hands with Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzahk Rabin, September 13, 1993. Rabin and Arafat shook hands for the 
first time after Israel and the PLO signed a historic agreement on Palestinian self-govern-
ment in the occupied territories. (J. DAVID AKE/AFP/GETTY IMAGES)
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in January 2001, by which point the Al-
Aqsa Intifada, or the second Intifada, 
had erupted. 
The second Intifada lasted for five 
years and took the lives of over 1,000 
Israelis and 4,000 Palestinians, includ-
ing military and civilian casualties. Ac-
cording to some accounts, it began with 
Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to the 
Temple Mount in Jerusalem on Sep-
tember 28, 2000. Sharon, a Likud party 
candidate running for prime minister, 
ascended the Al-Haram Al-Sharif with 
over 1,000 bodyguards. After his visit, 
which infuriated Palestinian bystand-
ers, he declared, “the Temple Mount 
is in our hands and will remain in our 
hands. It is the holiest site in Judaism 
and it is the right of every Jew to visit 
the Temple Mount.”⁠ Other accounts of 
the period blame Yasser Arafat and Pal-
estinian factions for pre-organizing the 
violence or not doing more to stop it 
when it erupted. 
The unrest extended to general 
strikes like the first Intifada, but also 
armed attacks on soldiers and civilians, 
assassination attempts against Israeli 
and Palestinian leaders, and a manifold 
increase in suicide bombing. These at-
tacks, which often targeted civilians, 
shook Israeli society to the core, and en-
gendered a rightward shift in domestic 
politics. The psychological trauma of 
recurring violence was no less intense 
for Palestinians. In both West Bank cit-
ies and the Gaza Strip, the PA was tar-
geted, urban centers were re-occupied 
by Israeli soldiers, and an expanded 
network of checkpoints controlled dai-
ly movement. There was a marked in-
crease in Israel’s use of targeted assas-
sinations against Palestinian militants 
in densely packed urban areas, resulting 
in civilian deaths as well. 
For many Americans, the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, emerged as a pri-
mary reference point for understand-
ing the violence in the Middle East. Is-
raeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who 
defeated Ehud Barak in the elections 
of February 2001, encouraged such a 
strong link. He found a stalwart ally in 
U.S. President George W. Bush, whose 
rubric of fighting the War on Terror 
resonated with Sharon’s own tactics at 
home. Sharon refused to meet with Yas-
ser Arafat; Bush made it clear that he 
would not deal with Arafat either. The 
Israelis launched “Operation Defen-
sive Shield” in March 2002, the largest 
post-Oslo incursion into the Palestinian 
territories, to “rout out…terrorist infra-
structure.” The destruction of the PA 
infrastructure in tandem with Sharon’s 
isolation of Arafat exacerbated divi-
sions between the ruling Fatah faction 
of Palestinian nationalists and Hamas, 
which would extend to a violent rupture 
several years later.
U.S. foreign policy during the Bush 
years had a formative impact on events 
in the Middle East, from the launching 
of two wars in Afghanistan and Iraq to 
a sweeping policy of democracy pro-
motion in the Arab world. Bush had a 
vision for addressing the Israeli-Pales-
tinian conflict that he unveiled in his 
Roadmap for Peace. In a speech on June 
24, 2002, Bush remarked, “the current 
situation offers no prospect that life will 
improve. Israeli citizens will continue to 
be victimized by terrorists, and so Israel 
will continue to defend herself, and the 
situation of the Palestinian people will 
grow more and more miserable. My vi-
sion is two states, living side by side, 
in peace and security.”⁠ This vision was 
conditioned on the removal of Arafat. 
Bush continued, “I call on the Palestin-
ian people to elect new leaders, leaders 
not compromised by terror.” 
Arafat died in France on November 
11, 2004, having been flown to a hos-
pital outside of Paris with a publicly 
unknown condition. ⁠ In the 2005 Pales-
tinian presidential elections, Palestin-
ians in the West Bank and Gaza chose 
Mahmoud Abbas as his successor. Ab-
bas has remained in the post ever since. 
In January 2006, Palestinian Legisla-
tive Council (PLC) elections brought 
Hamas to power, but the international 
community rejected the results. The 
U.S. opted for a policy of boycotting 
Hamas, which it viewed exclusively 
as a terrorist organization. The Quartet 
(EU, Russia, UN and U.S.) cut fund-
ing to the PA, and Israel withheld tax 
revenues it had collected. In June 2006, 
Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh sent Pres-
ident Bush a letter by way of an Ameri-
can professor asking for the boycott 
to be lifted, and de facto recognizing 
Israel. ⁠ As Haniyeh wrote, “We are so 
concerned about stability and security 
in the area that we don’t mind having 
a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders 
and offering a truce for many years…. 
We are not warmongers, we are peace 
Rescue crews remove body bags from the site of a Palestinian suicide 
bomb attack on a Jerusalem bus in June 2002. (RICKI ROSEN/CORBIS) 
A Palestinian hands his I.D. to an Israeli solider at a Jerusalem 
checkpoint in 1991. (DAVID H. WELLS/CORBIS)
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makers and we call on the American 
government to have direct negotiations 
with the elected government.” Bush did 
not answer, maintaining his boycott of 
the movement.
In Israel, Sharon’s retrenchment 
had led to a unilateral plan for with-
drawal from the Gaza Strip settlements 
by fall 2005. Rather than negotiations, 
the prime minister believed that Israel 
had to pursue an alternative path. In the 
words of his chief adviser, Dov Weis-
glass, the disengagement plan was part 
of a broader diplomatic agenda for Is-
rael vis-à-vis the Palestinians. 
The significance of the disengage-
ment plan is the freezing of the peace 
process...When you freeze that pro-
cess, you prevent the establishment 
of a Palestinian state, and you pre-
vent a discussion on the refugees, the 
borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, 
this whole package called the Pal-
estinian state, with all that it entails, 
has been removed indefinitely from 
our agenda. And all this with author-
ity and permission. All with a presi-
dential blessing and the ratification 
of both houses of Congress.
As Weisglass suggested, the U.S. 
played a crucial role in facilitating this 
move, a clear sign that the pattern of 
U.S. mediation between the Israelis and 
Palestinians had fully evolved into ac-
tive alignment with the agenda of one 
side during the Bush years. 
Alongside the disengagement plan, 
Sharon launched the construction of 
what the Israeli’s refer to as the secu-
rity barrier between Israel and the West 
Bank. The barrier consisted of large 
sections of fencing and a massive for-
tified wall in various locations. It was 
seen as a necessary counterterrorism 
measure by the Israeli public, but also 
signaled that the wall was a mecha-
nism to annex sections of Palestinian 
territory and ensure Israel’s retention of 
major settlements. The Israeli Supreme 
Court, which was besieged with peti-
tions by Palestinian farmers and fami-
lies cut off from their land and homes 
as a result of the barrier, ordered sev-
eral modifications but largely supported 
the endeavor. The debate over the wall 
reverberated abroad; many of Israel’s 
supporters viewed the fortification as a 
necessity for security, while critics con-
demned the wall for uprooting Palestin-
ian families, cutting homes from agri-
cultural land, and marring the landscape 
of the West Bank. Many believed that 
the barrier would mark Israel’s future 
border with a Palestinian state.⁠ In July 
2004, the International Court of Justice 
deemed the wall illegal, arguing that it 
was in violation of international law. 
Sharon suffered a massive stroke in 
January 2006. Ehud Olmert, the former 
mayor of Jerusalem, succeeded him. 
Olmert promised to continue with Sha-
ron’s disengagement plan, and extend it 
to the West Bank. The outbreak of the 
Second Lebanon War on July 12, 2006, 
shifted Olmert’s plans, as he responded 
with overwhelming force to Hezbol-
lah’s abduction of two Israeli soldiers 
along the northern border. The ensuing 
34-day war, during which Israel tar-
geted Hezbollah as well as Lebanese 
civilian infrastructure, and Hezbollah 
launched Katyusha rockets into Israel, 
led to the death of over 1,000 Lebanese 
and 163 Israelis. ⁠ In the wake of the 
2006 war, which also served as a proxy 
battle between Israel and Iran, Hez-
bollah claimed a victory by dint of its 
staying power despite the Israeli bom-
bardment. President Bush disagreed at 
the time, but in his memoir, Decision 
Points, he remarked that Israel’s “shaky 
military performance” had compro-
mised its international credibility. ⁠ In 
2007, the Winograd Commission, an 
Israeli commission of inquiry, accused 
Prime Minister Olmert of mishandling 
the war, and thousands of Israelis pro-
tested and demanded his resignation. 
For the Palestinian national move-
ment, the international boycott on 
Hamas sowed internal divisions with 
the secular Fatah faction, whose militias 
were being funded and trained by the 
U.S. and Arab states like Egypt, Jordan 
and Saudi Arabia. ⁠ A civil war erupted 
between the factions, and Hamas took 
over the Gaza Strip with Fatah remain-
ing entrenched in the West Bank. The 
Palestinian unity government, which 
had preserved joint Hamas and Fatah 
rule, was disbanded, and an “emergency 
cabinet” was set up with Salam Fayyad 
as the new technocratic prime minister. 
The U.S., taking a heightened interest 
in reviving peace efforts between Israel 
and the Palestinians now that Hamas 
was out of the picture, encouraged Is-
rael’s siege of Gaza and the lifting of 
sanctions in the West Bank. ⁠ Despite this 
move, Hamas remains a key constituent 
in the Palestinian national movement.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice 
led the Bush administration’s revival 
of U.S. efforts to mediate peace, and 
invited Israelis, Palestinians and other 
Arab representatives to a conference in 
Annapolis, MD, in November 2007. The 
Annapolis Conference was intended to 
restart the peace process and boost inter-
national support for a negotiated settle-
A Palestinian man walks along the Israeli-constructed barrier wall separating Jerusalem 
from Abu Dis, a village in the West Bank. (WENDY SUE LAMM/CONTRASTO/REDUX)
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ment between Israel and the Palestin-
ians. Once again, the U.S. had come to 
the realization that peace between Israel 
and its neighbors was a necessity for se-
curing U.S. interests in the region, and 
that by ignoring the urgency of the issue, 
the conflict had only been exacerbated. 
At the beginning of the conference, 
Bush read from a joint statement signed 
by the Israelis and the Palestinians sup-
porting a two-state solution. 
We agreed to immediately launch 
good faith, bilateral negotiations in 
order to conclude a peace treaty re-
solving all outstanding issues, includ-
ing core issues, without exception….
The final peace settlement will estab-
lish Palestine as a homeland for the 
Palestinian people just as Israel is the 
homeland for the Jewish people.
The parties agreed to meet regularly 
after Annapolis in order to implement 
Bush’s Roadmap and conclude a peace 
treaty by the end of 2008. On the day the 
conference ended, Olmert warned of the 
consequences of not reaching a solution 
with the Palestinians in an interview with 
the Israeli newspaper Ha’aretz. 
If the day comes when the two-state 
solution collapses, and we face a 
South African-style struggle for equal 
voting rights (also for the Palestin-
ians in the territories), then, as soon 
as that happens, the State of Israel 
is finished…. The Jewish organiza-
tions, which were our power base in 
America, will be the first to come out 
against us…because they will say 
they cannot support a state that does 
not support democracy and equal 
voting rights for all its residents.
It was a startling and frank admis-
sion by the prime minister, who con-
tinued negotiating with Abbas over the 
most contentious issues, including the 
division of Jerusalem and the Pales-
tinian right of return. Observers claim 
that the two leaders came very close to 
a resolution, meeting 26 times between 
Annapolis and the outbreak of the Gaza 
War on December 27, 2008.⁠
The number of rocket attacks from the 
Hamas-governed Gaza Strip increased 
throughout 2008, until a ceasefire was 
brokered between Israel and Hamas in 
June. An Israeli raid in Gaza was fol-
lowed by airstrikes targeting Hamas 
members and further rocket attacks. 
Olmert then launched “Operation Cast 
Lead,” a 22-day air campaign and ground 
invasion that pounded Gaza, resulting in 
the death of over 1,100 Palestinians and 
13 Israelis.⁠ Olmert intended to rout out 
rocket attacks and weapons smuggling 
into Gaza, with an undeclared goal of re-
moving Hamas from power, but attacks 
from the movement intensified during 
the confrontation. A unilateral Israeli 
ceasefire was declared on January 18, 
2009. The UN Fact Finding Mission on 
the Gaza Conflict, led by South African 
Justice Richard Goldstone, investigated 
the war and found both Palestinian mili-
tants and the Israeli army guilty of poten-
tial war crimes. Goldstone, coming un-
der pressure by Israel, would later retract 
his claim that the Israelis deliberately tar-
geted Palestinian civilians in the attack, 
having been unable to corroborate evi-
dence without Israel’s cooperation or to 
gather evidence in Gaza without Hamas’ 
full cooperation. But the legacy of the 
Gaza War remained a troubling one, 
given the humanitarian catastrophe that 
confronted the population of the Strip 
and Israel’s deepening isolation global-
ly. As The New York Times reported on 
the war’s impact, Israel faced its “worst 
diplomatic crisis in two decades.” Ehud 
Olmert, besieged by corruption charges, 
announced his intention to resign, and 
Israeli elections in February 2009 elec-
tions brought Benjamin Netanyahu back 
to office. There was little hope that the 
negotiations Olmert and Abbas had been 
pursuing would continue.  n
In the U.S., the transformative 2008 presidential elections brought 
Barack Obama to the White House. It 
was a heady time for supporters of a 
new American role around the globe, 
given the widespread disillusionment 
with the 43rd President. Bush’s ap-
proval rating—which was over 80% 
in the aftermath of 9/11—stood at 34% 
upon leaving office in January 2009. 
Obama’s victory spurred hopes in the 
Middle East that the U.S. would return 
to a more evenhanded policy when it 
came to the Arab world and Israel. In 
his first few weeks in office, the Presi-
dent appointed former U.S. Senator 
George Mitchell as his Special Envoy 
for Middle East Peace, a position in-
tended to demonstrate the importance 
the Obama administration placed on a 
resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian con-
flict. Mitchell, who had overseen nego-
tiations for peace in Northern Ireland as 
the architect of the Good Friday Agree-
ment and who had authored the Mitch-
ell Report on the Arab-Israeli conflict, 
obama and Israel
Hamas militia members take position after they evacuated Gaza streets in May 2006. The 
Hamas-led Palestinian government ordered its militia off Gaza’s streets in the wake of 
clashes with President Mahmoud Abbas’s rival Fatah movement that stirred fears of civil 
war. (MOHAMMED SALEM/REUTERS/CORBIS)
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was seen as a serious diplomat capable 
of achieving progress. More broadly, 
Obama wanted to change the image of 
the U.S. in the Middle East. “My job to 
the Muslim world is to communicate 
that the Americans are not your enemy,” 
Obama said in a January interview with 
Al-Arabiya, “We sometimes make mis-
takes. We have not been perfect.”
This theme would be expanded in 
Obama’s historic speech at Cairo Uni-
versity on June 4, 2009. In front of a 
large audience of Egyptian students, 
Obama charted a new path for U.S. en-
gagement in the region, and singled out 
Israel and the Palestinians as a primary 
concern. As Obama explained to his au-
dience, “America’s strong bonds with 
Israel are well known. This bond is un-
breakable. It is based upon cultural and 
historical ties, and the recognition that 
the aspiration for a Jewish homeland is 
rooted in a tragic history that cannot be 
denied.” Obama continued, turning to 
the Palestinians.
It is also undeniable that the Pales-
tinian people—Muslims and Chris-
tians— have suffered in pursuit of a 
homeland. … America will not turn 
our backs on the legitimate Palestin-
ian aspiration for dignity, opportu-
nity, and a state of their own.
In the President’s view, “the only 
resolution is for the aspirations of both 
sides to be met through two states, 
where Israelis and Palestinians each 
live in peace and security.” How to 
achieve this goal remained a difficult 
task. Obama stressed an end to Palestin-
ian violence, telling his audience that 
it would not resolve the conflict, and 
that Hamas would have to put an end 
to their tactics. As for Israel’s responsi-
bility, Obama implored Israelis to “ac-
knowledge that just as Israel’s right to 
exist cannot be denied, neither can Pal-
estine’s. The United States does not ac-
cept the legitimacy of continued Israeli 
settlements. This construction violates 
previous agreements and undermines 
efforts to achieve peace. It is time for 
these settlements to stop.” 
As it had been for Carter and Begin 
30 years earlier, Obama’s disagreement 
with Netanyahu over the settlements 
would derail his ambitious first term 
agenda for a resolution to the conflict. 
Ten days after Obama’s Cairo speech, 
Netanyahu delivered his own address at 
Bar-Ilan University, where he formally 
accepted the principle of two states liv-
ing side by side. 
We must also tell the truth in its en-
tirety: within this homeland lives a 
large Palestinian community. We do 
not want to rule over them, we do not 
want to govern their lives, we do not 
want to impose either our flag or our 
culture on them. In my vision of peace, 
in this small land of ours, two peoples 
live freely, side-by-side, in amity and 
mutual respect. Each will have its own 
flag, its own national anthem, its own 
government. Neither will threaten the 
security or survival of the other.
For Netanyahu, however, the content 
of that Palestinian state was far less than 
they would be willing to accept: It was 
to be “demilitarized,” with Jerusalem 
remaining the capital of Israel, and the 
Palestinians giving up on the right of re-
turn. Netanyahu also argued that natural 
growth for existing Jewish settlements 
on the West Bank would be permissible. 
This position, which was enacted 
via a 10-month settlement freeze, did 
not include East Jerusalem or apply to 
the 3,000 housing units already under 
construction. During a visit by U.S. 
Vice President Joseph Biden to Israel 
in March 2010, Netanyahu’s govern-
ment announced the construction of 
1,600 further units in the East Jerusalem 
neighborhood of Ramat Shlomo. Secre-
tary of State Hillary Clinton called the 
move “deeply negative,” and Obama 
was reportedly “livid.” General David 
Petraeus, testifying in front of the Sen-
ate Armed Services Committee shortly 
after Biden’s visit, remarked that ten-
sions over  Israel-Palestine have “an 
enormous effect on the strategic con-
text in which we operate.” Netanyahu, 
acknowledging the bad timing, still 
defended the building in a Jerusalem 
neighborhood as part of long-standing 
Israeli policy. “Our policy on Jerusalem 
is the same policy followed by all Israeli 
governments for 42 years, and it has not 
changed. As far as we are concerned, 
building in Jerusalem is the same as 
building in Tel Aviv,” Netanyahu re-
marked. The President met with Netan-
yahu at the White House on March 26, 
in an encounter that by most accounts 
was unpleasant. Obama asked for writ-
ten guarantees that the freeze would 
be extended, but Netanyahu refused to 
give them. Reports about U.S.-Israeli 
relations were filled with recrimination 
and anger in the media, having hit the 
lowest point in years.
In September 2010, Obama hosted 
Netanyahu, Abbas, Jordan’s King Abdul-
lah and Special Envoy Mitchell for the 
restart of negotiations to reach a final 
status settlement. As Israel’s settlement 
moratorium lapsed, the talks broke down, 
and Mitchell eventually resigned from the 
office of the Special Envoy in May 2011. 
Palestinian protesters throw stones at Israeli vehicles during an October 2013 protest 
against the expanding of Jewish settlements in Kufr Qadoom village, near the West Bank 
city of Nablus. (NIDAL ESHTAVEH/XINHUA/EYEVINE/REDUX)
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After his own resignation as secretary of 
defense some months later, Robert Gates 
reportedly remarked that Netanyahu was 
“ungrateful” to the U.S., who received 
“nothing in return” for ensuing Israel’s 
security. Sentiments like those from 
Gates seeped down into public discourse, 
with more vocal criticism and frustra-
tion mounting with the policies of the 
right-wing Likud-led government. Even 
within the American pro-Israel commu-
nity there were signs of fracturing, as the 
growth of a more centrist political action 
group, J Street, mounted a challenge to 
the rightward leaning lobby powerhouse, 
the American-Israel Public Affairs Com-
mittee (aipac). 
Obama publically declared his sup-
port for the demarcation of an Israeli-
Palestinian border along the 1967 lines 
in the spring of 2011. He clarified that 
this included mutually agreed land 
swaps after his speech elicited criticism 
from Republican officials. The political 
costs of the President’s involvement in 
Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking had 
become abundantly clear ahead of 
the 2012 elections. The upheaval in 
the Arab world, which had begun in 
Tunisia at the end of 2010, had also 
shaken the U.S. position in the region. 
The “Arab Spring”—a contested term 
used to describe events as disparate as 
the Egyptians overthrow of the long-
standing President Hosni Mubarak to 
the protests in Syria that turned into a 
full-scale civil war—nonetheless left 
an indelible mark on Israel and the Pal-
estinians. It also shaped the degree of 
U.S. involvement in resolving the con-
flict given the proliferation of other re-
gional crises. As Obama won reelection 
in 2012, and Netanyahu emerged with 
a third term as prime minister in early 
2013, the complexities and tensions af-
fecting the U.S.-Israeli relationship had 
not at all subsided.
In an effort to reset his relations with 
Israel, Obama’s first trip abroad in his 
second term was to Israel and the West 
Bank. He delivered a major speech di-
rectly to Israeli students in Jerusalem’s 
International Convention Center on 
March 21, 2013. In his speech, Obama 
displayed a close identification with the 
Jewish state: 
tion, having pinned their hopes on an 
American president who might restore 
balance to American involvement in 
the region.
Yet Obama, like so many of his pre-
decessors, faced a crush of domestic 
and foreign policy crises, and could not 
expend the political capital that would 
result from entangling himself in the 
intricacies of Israeli-Palestinian peace-
making. On July 29, 2013, the presi-
dent appeared alongside former U.S. 
Ambassador to Israel, Martin Indyk, 
appointing him as the new Special En-
voy for Middle East Peace. Indyk, who 
had extensive government experience 
and went on to head the Saban Center 
for Middle East Policy at the Brookings 
Institution in Washington, DC, would 
shoulder the burden of U.S. involve-
ment along with the new secretary of 
state, John Kerry. A passionate voice 
for American engagement in Arab-Is-
raeli peacemaking from his time in the 
Senate, Kerry had signaled this issue 
as a top priority after taking office in 
early 2013. During his UN General As-
sembly speech in September, Obama 
announced the pursuit of Israeli-Pales-
tinian peace as a priority alongside the 
negotiation of a nuclear deal with Iran 
and addressing the civil war in Syria.
The scaling back of U.S. engage-
ment with Egypt and the broader unrest 
in the Arab world signaled a more mod-
est agenda for American foreign policy 
in the Middle East, one that recognized 
the limits of military intervention. Op-
ponents of this new agenda voiced 
concern that it also revealed Ameri-
can weakness in the region, a similar 
criticism that surfaced when Reagan 
defeated Carter in 1980. Behind the 
scenes, the Israelis and the Palestinians 
conducted several rounds of negotia-
tions, excluding Indyk from some of 
the meetings. They set a nine-month 
timetable to reach an agreement. At 
the time of this writing, the negotia-
tions have failed to produce a viable 
framework for a political solution. Ne-
tanyahu’s detractors have argued that 
his demands are unreasonable and the 
prime minister is proceeding with bad 
faith.
On November 7, 2013, Kerry criti-
I believe that Israel is rooted not just 
in history and tradition, but also in a 
simple and profound idea: the idea 
that people deserve to be free in a 
land of their own…. And Israel has 
achieved this even as it has overcome 
relentless threats to its security—
through the courage of the Israel 
Defense Forces, and a citizenry that 
is resilient in the face of terror.
Observers noted the change in tone 
from Obama’s Cairo speech, which had 
put many Israelis on edge. Here was an 
American leader in the heart of Jerusa-
lem, speaking directly to young people 
(rather than their political leaders in the 
Knesset), signaling that he identified 
with their success and empathized with 
the challenges they faced. At the same 
time, Obama turned to the fate of the 
Palestinians, and the underlying tension 
that animates Israeli political reality. 
The Palestinian people’s right to 
self-determination and justice must 
also be recognized. …Neither occu-
pation nor expulsion is the answer. 
Just as Israelis built a state in their 
homeland, Palestinians have a right 
to be a free people in their own land.
It was a bracing assessment by 
Obama, who had compelled his audi-
ence to acknowledge the untenable na-
ture of the occupation, and the degree 
to which it was compromising the core 
of Israel’s identity as a democracy. 
Obama put forth his own set of prin-
ciples that could guide the parties back 
to negotiations. “Now is the time for 
the Arab World to take steps toward 
normalized relations with Israel. Mean-
while, Palestinians must recognize that 
Israel will be a Jewish state, and that Is-
raelis have the right to insist upon their 
security. Israelis must recognize that 
continued settlement activity is coun-
terproductive to the cause of peace, 
and that an independent Palestine must 
be viable with real borders that have 
to be drawn.” The statement on bor-
ders echoed Obama’s earlier calls for 
the return to the 1967 lines, but the 
insistence that Palestinians recognize 
Israel as a “Jewish state” was a nod to 
the demands of Prime Minister Netan-
yahu. Critics dismissed the speech as 
a wholesale adoption of Israel’s posi-
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cized the Israelis for their actions on 
settlements during a press conference 
with Netanyahu in Jerusalem. The 
latest Israeli moves, which included 
the surprise announcement of more 
than 20,000 planned settlement units 
by Housing Minister Uri Ariel, went 
even further than previous building in 
bisecting a possible Palestinian state. 
In the view of some observers, the an-
nouncement revealed an internal power 
struggle between Netanyahu and the 
more intransigent right-wing members 
of his coalition government who hope 
to scuttle any possible deal. Regard-
less of the reason, this action elicited 
the resignation letters of the chief Pal-
estinian negotiators, Saeb Erekat and 
Mohammed Shtayyeh, who vocally 
opposed Israeli settlement activity. 
Erekat, who has attempted to resign 
several times before, criticized Israel’s 
“government of settlers, for settlers and 
by settlers.” Mahmoud Abbas suggest-
ed that the PA might consider pursuing 
the UN Security Council as a venue to 
discuss the settlements, despite having 
promised Kerry not to go to the inter-
national community for the duration of 
the negotiations. 
relations today
2014 is poised to be a decisive year for 
U.S.-Israeli relations in light of ongo-
ing international attempts to broker a 
deal with Iran on the nuclear issue and 
the narrowing timetable for an agree-
ment with the Palestinians. Israeli stra-
tegic thinkers may not countenance a 
nuclear equipped Iran, but they also 
recognize the constraints under which 
their government can act. The recent 
diplomatic solution brokered by the P5 
+1 (the five permanent members of the 
UN Security Council and Germany) 
in Geneva in November undermines 
Israel’s international legitimacy in the 
event of a unilateral attack on Iranian 
soil. Some of Israel’s staunchest allies 
in Congress worry that American diplo-
macy is compromising Israel’s window 
of immunity. During a congressional 
briefing against new Iranian sanctions 
in November, Secretary Kerry’s state-
ments were brandished as “anti-Israeli” 
by Republican senators, a reminder that 
U.S.-Israeli relations remain fraught. 
But while Netanyahu’s repeated calls 
for swift action may resonate in some 
parts of Washington, the leadership in 
Jerusalem knows that the relationship 
between the two countries and their 
mutual security interests are too inter-
twined to countenance unilateral action 
in the face of a red light from President 
Obama. 
In his Jerusalem speech, Obama ac-
knowledged these tensions and spoke 
forcefully about the dangers posed to 
Israel and the U.S. in the event of a 
nuclear-armed Iran. “When I consider 
Israel’s security, I also think about a 
people who have a living memory of 
the Holocaust, faced with the prospect 
of a nuclear-armed Iranian government 
that has called for Israel’s destruction. 
It’s no wonder Israelis view this as an 
existential threat. But this is not simply 
a challenge for Israel – it is a danger for 
the entire world, including the United 
States…As President, I have said to the 
world that all options are on the table for 
achieving our objectives. America will 
do what we must to prevent a nuclear-
armed Iran.” It is a promise that contin-
ues to mitigate Israeli concerns about 
the diplomatic breakthrough in Geneva, 
but for how long? There are reports of 
joint Israeli-Saudi Arabian planning 
for a military option against Iran in 
the wake of a diplomatic agreement, a 
further sign of shifting alliances in the 
Middle East. As the U.S. tries to manage 
these competing tensions in the region, 
in addition to the upheaval in Egypt and 
the civil war in Syria, Iran’s nuclear is-
sue will continue to shape relations with 
Israel in the coming year. 
Whether or not the successive 
rounds of talks between Israel and the 
Palestinians amount to an agreement, 
the persistent lack of a resolution pro-
foundly shapes American—and glob-
al—opinions of Israel. From the birth 
of the Palestinian refugee problem in 
1948 through the onset of Israel’s oc-
cupation in 1967 and the more recent 
attempts to reach a two-state solution, 
the question of equality and civil rights 
has taken center stage. Israel’s conflict-
ing identity as both a proud democracy 
and a definitively Jewish state continue 
to clash with one another. The country’s 
staunchest supporters have grown un-
comfortable with the structural inequal-
ity that is manifest in the political status 
quo, both inside Israel and in its rela-
tionship to the Palestinians. Of all Isra-
el’s allies, perhaps no country is as well 
equipped as the U.S. to recognize the 
risks of this imbalance, and to support a 
resolution. But given the track record of 
American involvement in the peace pro-
cess, and the longer history of relations 
with Israel, there is no guarantee that the 
U.S. can play a constructive role. So it 
may be up to Israel—the most powerful 
player in this conflict, albeit an anxious 
and beleaguered one—to reckon with 
what the future might hold.   n
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discussion questions
suggested readings
1. Israel has grown as a democratic government that has developed 
key institutional strengths through freedom of the press, civil society 
and fair elections. It has also pursued settlement expansion pro-
grams and the construction of the West Bank wall. Do such policies 
and actions curtail the democratic potential of Israel? 
2. Leaders have dealt with various strategies for negotiations regard-
ing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With past mediation efforts in 
mind, is the piecemeal approach a viable path toward peace deals? Is 
success dependent on the political administration and the individual 
leaders that are involved in the negotiation efforts? 
3. How has the Arab Spring impacted U.S. relations with Israel? 
How has the tumultuous political environment of the Middle East 
influenced Israeli-Palestinian negotiations? 
4. To what extent are there similarities between U.S. foreign policy 
in the Middle East and Israel’s national interest in the region? Did 
a special relationship between the United States and Israel evolve 
from coinciding foreign policy interests in the Middle East or did 
such a special relationship exist prior to coinciding foreign policy 
agendas?
5. In September 2013, President Barack Obama and President Has-
san Rouhani held the first telephone conversation between high of-
ficials of the two countries since 1979; in November 2013, the U.S. 
and five countries struck a deal to temporarily freeze Iran’s nuclear 
program. What do such efforts signal to Israel, and how do U.S. 
negotiations with Iran shape Israeli foreign policy in the region? 
6. Each United States president has assigned varying degrees of 
attention to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the larger context of 
Arab-Israeli issues. Would it be more advantageous for the Obama 
administration to view other regional powers as partners in me-
diation efforts or has the Israeli-Palestinian issue developed into a 
conflict solely between two entities?  
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